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Political Legitimacy without a (Claim-) Right to Rule 
Abstract In the contemporary philosophical literature, political legitimacy is often 
identified with a right to rule. However, this term is problematic. First, if we accept an interest 
theory of rights, it often remains unclear whose interests justify a right to rule (the 'grounds of 
authority' question): either the interest of the holders of this right to rule or the interests of those 
subject to the authority. And second, if we analyse the right to rule in terms of Wesley Hohfeld's 
characterisation of rights, we find disagreement among philosophers about what constitutes the 
conceptual core of political authority: a power-right or a claim-right to rule (the 'nature of 
authority question'). In this paper I show that both of these are problematic for a number of 
reasons. First, if we think that it is only the interests of the holders of a right to rule that justify 
the possession of authority, the conceptual core of authority must consist in a claim-right. 
However, this understanding of authority biases our thinking about legitimacy in favor of 
democratic exercises of power. Second, if we hold such a decisively democratic view of 
legitimacy, we confront an impasse with respect to addressing global collective action problems. 
Although it is clear that political authority is necessary or useful for solving these issues, it is 
doubtful that we can establish global institutions that are democratically authorized anytime 
soon. The paper suggests an alternative 'Power-Right to Command View' of political legitimacy 
that avoids the democratic bias and allows for thinking about solutions to global problems via 
global service authorities. 
Keywords Authority, Legitimacy, Hohfeld, Democracy, Global Justice 
This paper pursues the question: how can we best characterize the idea of political legitimacy? 
When we ask whether some political authority possesses legitimacy in the normative rather than 
the sociological sense, we want to know two interrelated things; namely, whether this political 
authority is permitted to create laws, authoritative directives, and rules in general, and whether 
the subjects of the authority have decisive moral reasons to comply with these instructions.  
In the contemporary philosophical literature on this topic, political legitimacy is often 
identified with a ‘right to rule, where this is understood as correlated with an obligation to obey 
on the part of those subject to the authority’ (Raz 1985, p. 3; see also Buchanan and Keohane 
2006, p. 405; and Tasioulas 201, pp. 97, 98). However, this conception of legitimacy, as it is 
used by most philosophers, is problematic. First, if we accept an interest theory of rights it often 
remains unclear whose interests justify a right to rule (the ‘grounds of authority’ question): either 
the interest of the right-holders or the interests of those subject to the authority. And second, if 
we analyse the right to rule in terms of Wesley Hohfeld’s characterisation of rights (Hohfeld 
1919), we find disagreement among philosophers about what constitutes the conceptual core of 
political authority: a power-right or a claim-right to rule (the ‘nature of authority question’).1 
Both of these are problematic for a number of reasons. First, as I explain below, our response 
to the former ‘grounds of authority’ question has implications for our answer to the latter ‘nature 
of authority’ question. If we think that it is only the interests of the right-holders of the right to 
rule that justify the possession of authority then the conceptual core of authority must consist in a 
claim-right to rule. However, as will become clear, this understanding of authority biases our 
thinking about legitimacy in favour of democratic exercises of power. This is because, if we 
think that it is the interests of the holders of a right to rule that justify authority, we cannot hold 
jointly the claims that 
(a) The legitimate exercise of political authority rests on a right to rule, 
(b) All rights are ultimately grounded in some interest of the right-holders, and that 
                                                          
1 I name proponents of both of these options in the next section. 
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(c) There can be non-democratic political authorities that are nonetheless fully legitimate in 
that they are able to give decisive moral reasons for compliance to their subjects. 
Second, if we hold such a decisively democratic view of political authority (which is based on 
the interests of the right-holders and a claim-right to rule), we confront an impasse with respect 
to addressing global collective action problems like climate change, poverty, the international tax 
competition, and regulating the global financial markets. Although it is clear that political 
authority is necessary (or at least useful) for solving these pressing issues it is doubtful that we 
can establish global institutions that are democratically authorized and therefore possess a claim-
right to rule anytime soon. 
Thus my aim in this paper is twofold. First, I show that interpreting political legitimacy as a 
claim-right to rule imposes implausibly demanding democratic requirements on the justifiability 
of political authority.  I argue that our primary (in the sense of basic) notion of political authority 
rather has to be a non-democratic one. According to this alternative understanding of political 
legitimacy, authority (1) is based on the interests of the subjects of the authority, and (2) has as 
its conceptual core a Hohfeldian power-right. Second, I demonstrate that one of the advantages 
of a conception of political legitimacy based on a moral power to command is that it leaves more 
normative room to think about how to solve pressing coordination issues – in particular questions 
of global justice – than the claim-right to rule view. 
A prominent idea: political legitimacy grounded in a claim-right to rule 
Philosophers typically describe the nature of political authority in terms of the effects it has on 
people.  One of Joseph Raz’s central insights into political authority is that the exercise of 
political authority changes (in some way) the normative situation of those subject to the authority 
(Raz 1986, p. 99). A helpful way to analyse the effects of the exercise of political authority on its 
subjects is to consider the exercise in terms of Hohfeldian rights-incidents. According to 
Hohfeld, every right includes at least one legal or moral advantage (Hohfeld 1919, p. 36). 
Furthermore, each of these advantages correlates with a disadvantage of the person bound by that 
right. Within Hohfeld’s scheme there are four such ‘incidents’:  
(1) If you possess a claim-right, this gives me a regarding duty to respect or fulfil that claim. 
(2) If you have a permission, then I have no right to hinder your exercise of this privilege.  
(3) If you possess a power, then I am liable to having my normative situation altered by you.  
(4) Finally, if you possess an immunity, I have a correlative disability in this respect.  
Legitimate authority is often understood as consisting in a ‘bundle’ of right-incidents (see Copp 
1999, p. 18). Typically, the most central incidents are identified as a moral power to alter the 
subjects’ normative situation, and a permission to implement those changes. A further question 
is: why should the subjects have to comply with the instructions of the authority? Is such 
compliance mandatory due to the authority’s claim-right to be obeyed or is compliance made 
necessary by the authority’s exercise of a moral power that changes its subjects’ normative 
situation? 
In discussions of political legitimacy as a right to rule, many philosophers do not clearly 
explain the nature and the grounds of this right, nor the relation between these. Some important 
theorists claim that the conceptual core of legitimate authority is a moral power,2 and (as will 
become clear throughout this paper) I do not disagree with this. However, there are others who 
hold that legitimacy rests on the authority possessing a claim-right to rule and to be obeyed. For 
instance, George Klosko writes that ‘we can say that an entity that is able to claim general 
                                                          
2 See Applbaum (2010), Copp (1999), Perry (2013), Raz (1986, p. 24). 
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obligations possesses ‘authority,’ that is, a claim-right to the obedience of the relevant 
population’ (Klosko 2004, p. 21, italics added). Further, A. John Simmons argues that ‘state 
legitimacy […] includes an exclusive power over subjects to impose duties and enforce them 
coercively, which correlates with obligations on others to refrain from these tasks. It also 
includes a right, held against subjects, to be obeyed (i.e., to have any imposed duties discharged). 
This latter right is the logical correlate of subjects' political obligations’ (Simmons 2001, p. 130, 
italics added).3 And Stephen Darwall thinks of the rights of authorities to the obedience of their 
subjects ‘specifically [in terms of] a ‘claim right’’ (Darwall 2010, p. 262).4 
The claim-right to rule view is commonly taken to refer to the authority of democratic 
institutions.5 The clearest account of this democratic interpretation of the claim-right to rule has 
been suggested by Thomas Christiano (2008) as part of his theory of democracy as the public 
realisation of people’s moral equality. As Christiano explains, it is generally accepted today that 
everyone has a justified interest in having the opportunity to participate in political decision-
making processes about issues that deeply affect their lives. Normally the entity in which such 
decisions are publically made these days is the state. This is not to say, though, that collective 
decision-making has to be limited to the domestic sphere (as the example of the European Union 
shows) or that democratic participation should be restricted to the level of nation states. 
However, what is generally important for all persons is that they are not merely told what to do 
but that they can have a say in the determination of the public rules that regulate their lives. 
Thus, on the Hohfeldian model it is plausible to hold that all persons have a claim-right to 
                                                          
3 It seems odd to think that Simmons takes this special right held against the subjects to be another power-right 
instead of a claim-right.  
4 My thanks to Justin Tosi for his thoughts on the commitments of these theorists. 
5 There is also a non-democratic version of the claim-right to rule view. However, for reasons explained in footnote 
7, in this paper I confine my discussion of the claim-right to rule to (and refer to this view in terms of) the 
democratic interpretation of this idea.  
participate in political processes about momentous decisions that pertain to them. But people 
disagree on what the right thing to do is. Democratic states solve this problem by way of the 
egalitarian procedure that gives everyone equal opportunities to influence the outcome of the 
decision-making process. The citizens authorize a representative government to act in their name 
and this government therefore ‘embodies’ (Christiano 2008, p. 247) the choices of its citizens. It 
is ‘because all citizens have rights to an equal say and because the democratic assembly is the 
institutional method by which these equal political rights are exercised, [that] the democratic 
assembly has a right to rule’ (Christiano 2008, p. 248).  
Conversely, (given everyone’s legitimate interest in participating in the collective decision-
making process as well as their disagreement about what ought to be done) people’s claim-right 
to participation gives rise to everyone’s duty to obey the outcome of their own collective choices. 
This is because ‘the democratic origin of the legislation makes it such that those who disobey it 
treat others as inferior because  democracy is the public realisation of equality […], so 
individuals owe it to each other to obey it’ (Christiano 2008, p. 97). Although every person has a 
legitimate interest to participate in the making of collective decisions that deeply affect them it is 
only within a democracy that the claim-right that this interest gives rise to is respected and 
publically acknowledged. Consequently, it is only within democratic structures that there exists a 
general duty to obey the laws that reflect the choices of their morally equal authors.6 The same 
                                                          
6 I take Christiano to be an especially clear proponent of the democratic conception of the claim-right to rule view. 
However, Christiano also holds that there can be other forms of justified authorities like the bureaucracy of 
democratic states or even hostile but justified occupational forces (Christiano 2008, p. 241). Still, for him these other 
forms of authority are not primary notions of authority and often seem to be justified merely by their connection to 
democratic forms of authority (e.g. as in the case of the bureaucracy of a democratic state). For reasons I explain in 
footnote 22, I do not think that Christiano argues that non-democratic authorities are legitimate without deriving 
their justification from another, more basic democratic authority. However, even if Christiano would want to accept 
the idea of independent, non-democratic authorities suggested here, it still would be the case that anyone who holds 
the democratic right-to rule view would have to deny that there can be independently legitimate non-democratic 
authorities. 
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cannot be said of non-democratic institutions since these are not a public expression of our moral 
equality and (thus neither) of our general duty to respect each other and our conflicting political 
opinions.7 
Why the ‘right to rule view’ is problematic 
What is unfortunate about this claim-right to rule account of political legitimacy is that it biases 
our thinking about what kind of political institutions can be legitimate. This becomes clear when 
we consider that the claim-right to rule view makes it impossible for us to hold jointly three 
claims, all of which seem prima facie plausible. Thus, roughly stated, if we accept that 
(a) The legitimate exercise of political authority rests on a right to rule 
as well as the widely held view that 
(b) All rights are ultimately grounded in some interest of the right-holders, 
then we preclude the possibility that 
(c) There can be non-democratic political authorities that are nonetheless fully legitimate in 
that they are able to give decisive moral reasons for compliance to their subjects. 
As we saw, there is agreement in the literature that claim (a) is correct and we can thus accept it 
for the sake of the argument advanced in this paper. Further, it does not seem implausible to 
                                                          
7 There are also cases where someone has a claim-right to our obedience if we have consented to this person having 
authority over us in a certain respect. We can think of the case of a guide who agrees to lead a tourist on a tour to the 
top of a mostly inactive volcano on the condition that the tourist unconditionally obeys her orders that pertain to this 
expedition. However, in the realm of politics such non-democratic instances of a claim-right to rule are not the norm 
and they do not generally explain the legitimacy of authorities that rule over large numbers of people. This is why 
Simmons (who is a proponent of this non-democratic claim-right view) argues that it is unlikely that there are any 
legitimate states (see Simmons 1979).  
accept that claim (b), the interest theory of rights, is correct as well.8 Claim (c) is plausible for 
many people because (as will be explained below) also non-democratic authorities can be 
deemed legitimate if they serve their subjects in particularly important ways. However, if we 
accept the view that legitimate authority is based on a claim-right to rule and that all rights are 
based on the interest of the right-holder, we have to ask who those right-holders are that have a 
justified interest in ruling. 
One group of people who do not qualify in this respect are the persons holding public offices 
of government. Fortunately, gone are the days when people thought that certain qualities of 
individual persons (such as their noble birth) naturally gave them a claim-right to hold political 
power and to the obedience of their subjects. It is no longer acceptable to think that our elected 
democratic representatives have personal interests in holding their offices in any normatively 
relevant sense which could justify a claim-right of theirs to rule. It is certainly the case that our 
legislators personally benefit from the salaries and pensions attached to their offices. They also 
might enjoy being able to give orders to others. But these advantages that are conferred on 
people that hold public positions are not the reasons why we maintain such offices in the first 
place. Instead, it is only individuals who have an equally justified interest in (and a claim-right 
to) having a say in the collective decision-making of their political community. No king, class of 
people, or party could, morally speaking, have a similarly justified interest in exercising political 
power. As a result, on the claim-right view ‘the idea of a [claim-] right to rule [...] seems to be 
the primary notion of legitimacy while [other accounts] are dim reflections of this primary 
notion’ (Christiano 2008, p. 241).  Thus, to characterize legitimate authority as being based on a 
                                                          
8 There are of course philosophers who do not accept the interest theory such as Hillel Steiner (1998) or Leif Wenar 
(2005). However, given that the interest theory of rights is widely accepted I assume its correctness for the purpose 
for the argument made in this paper. 
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claim-right limits the range of possible fully justified authorities to those that are democratically 
authorized, which is to deny claim (c) above. This shows that our answers to the ‘grounds of 
authority’ question (whose interests justify authority?) and the ‘nature of authority’ question 
(what is the conceptual core of political authority?) are intricately linked. Further, though, the 
previous discussion of the democratic account of legitimacy illustrates that the ‘grounds of 
authority’ question is prior to the ‘nature of authority’ question: we need to know whose interests 
justify the possession of political authority before we can say what this right fundamentally 
consists in (a moral power or claim-right). 
In the following sections, I will demonstrate the counter-intuitive and counter-productive 
conclusions that follow from the normative narrowing of legitimate authority to democratic 
authorities.  
The problematic denial of binding pre-democratic political authority 
What is problematic about the thought that only democratic authorities are fully legitimate? 
There are at least two considerations that count against the idea that democratic authority is the 
primary form of political legitimacy.  
The first problem is that the claim-right to rule view commits us to saying that before the 
founding of the first real democracy there had never been any political authority that was able to 
give its subjects discrete moral reasons for compliance. But if this is correct, previous authorities 
must have ruled on the basis of some less comprehensive, piecemeal notion of political 
legitimacy. As their subjects, we would have only been under a duty to follow their instructions 
if these reproduced independent moral obligation (see Perry 2013, p. 10). However, such duties 
consequently would not have depended on anything about the authority itself but entirely on the 
quality of the content of the instructions (about which there will always have been 
disagreement). As David Hume notes, this is quite an odd thought. In his essay ‘On the Original 
Contract’ (Hume 1994) Hume aims to criticize the idea that the subjects’ consent is a necessary 
condition for a general duty to obey political authorities. He points out that throughout human 
history people have been obedient to the ruling authorities. Hume thinks that it is unlikely that all 
of these people were mistaken to think that they ever were under a duty to comply with the 
orders of their rulers. Concerning the supposed necessity of consent for the legitimate exercise of 
power, he famously points out that 
It is strange, that an act of mind, which every individual is supposed to have 
formed, and after he came to the use of reason too, otherwise it could have no 
authority; that this act, I say, should be so unknown to all of them, that, over the 
face of the whole earth, there scarcely remain any traces or memory of it (Hume 
1994, p. 189).  
From a moral perspective pre-democratic authorities surely were always liable to at least one 
criticism: they failed to respect the moral equality of their subjects in the political decision-
making process. This, though, is not the same as the claim that such non-democratic authorities 
were generally unable to give their subjects decisive moral reasons for compliance because they 
did not possess a claim-right to be obeyed.  
Thus, if we reject claim (c) we also have to accept that prior to the existence of democracy it 
was always morally permissible for people both to refuse to surrender their judgement to their 
non-democratic rulers and to treat their rulers’ commands as authoritative. Such subjects could 
still have acted wrongly. However, the wrongness of their actions would have been due to errors 
This paper was published by Res Publica and is available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11158-015-9267-0 
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in their own judgment. They would not have been wrong merely by disobeying the instructions 
of their non-democratic rulers. There would have been nothing particular about the authoritative 
commands that gave the subjects in this pre-democratic age reasons to comply with prohibitions 
on murder, theft, and fraud. Of course, subjects of pre-democratic authorities too can be thought 
to have authority-independent moral obligations to refrain from such acts. Still, they would have 
been correct to claim that it was up to them to determine how to best comply with moral duties 
that applied to them: on the claim-right to rule view, authoritative directives of non-democratic 
authorities that disallow such offenses cannot be morally binding – which is a very strong claim. 
So the first problem of the right to rule notion of political legitimacy is that a rejection of claim 
(c) commits us to the thought that fully legitimate and binding authority did not exist prior to the 
establishment of the first real democracy. Some readers might of course think that the view that 
any pre-democratic authority was ever legitimate is unacceptable. They might think that 
whatever benefits pre-democratic regimes provided for their subjects cannot outweigh the facts 
that such regimes were normally oppressive, disrespected the moral equality of persons, and 
were based on unverifiable justifications and brute force. 
The service conception of authority 
There is, however, another problem that renders implausible the view that the only fully 
legitimate authorities are democratic ones that possess a claim-right to be obeyed. The problem 
is that the claim-right to rule view denies the fundamental importance of the existence of 
authority or, put another way: the crucial value that authorities can have as servants of their 
subjects.  
We approach the basic value of political authority when we consider that there are other 
accounts of legitimacy that are highly plausible but that do not include democratic authorisation 
as a necessary condition. These alternative characterisations of legitimate authority ground the 
justification of the exercise of political power not in the interests of the right-holders of a right to 
rule but in the interests of those subject to an authority and thus provide a distinctive answer to 
the ‘grounds of authority’ question.9 One such conception of legitimacy is Raz’s ‘service 
conception’ of political authority that is not based on a claim-right to rule but has as its 
conceptual core a moral power to command those subject to the authority (Raz 1986, p. 24). 
Raz’s theory of legitimate authority has been influential and is based on the normal justification 
thesis (hereafter: NJT): 
the normal way to establish that a person has authority over another person 
involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons 
which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative directives) if he accepts 
the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to 
follow them, rather than by trying to follow the reasons which apply to him 
directly (Raz 1986, p. 53). 
This NJT, of course, does not sit well with the claim-right to rule view since in justifying 
authority it makes no reference to the interests of right-holders. The thesis does not primarily 
focus on the subjects’ interest in having their moral equality respected and publicly realized, but 
on the subjects’ morally-relevant interests in general, and the value that political authorities can 
                                                          
9 This is true irrespectively whether we think of interests as being necessary or merely sufficient for the justification 
of rights. I thank Andres Moles for helpful discussion on this point. 
This paper was published by Res Publica and is available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11158-015-9267-0 
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have through facilitating these interests.10  As an example we can think of a situation in which I 
am a father and suffer from a dangerous disease. However, the physician who is the foremost 
expert in treating this disease turns out to prioritize some of his other patients to whom he has 
close personal ties. Now, it is obvious that such a physician is liable to criticism for his biased 
way of treating his patients unequally. Nonetheless, if he is the best hope I have to be saved from 
death (and he treats me in the medically optimal way) I have very important moral reasons to 
swallow my sense of indignation and to submit myself to his (biased) care so that I survive and 
can keep taking care of my child. 
According to Raz, authority works by giving us ‘content-independent reasons’ (Raz 1986, p. 
35) for action. This means that the fact that the authority is the source of an instruction is a 
reason to comply with it irrespectively of the content of that order. We might, for instance, think 
that we have reasons to hide some of our money from the tax office to save it for the education of 
our children. However, since it is a legitimate government that instructs us to pay taxes, we 
ought to take the state’s instruction as giving us a sound reason to pay, and to refrain from acting 
on the countervailing consideration. Raz summarizes this effect of the exercise of authority in his 
pre-emption thesis. This holds that ‘the fact that an authority requires performance of an action is 
a reason for its performance which is not to be added to all other relevant reasons when assessing 
what to do, but should exclude and take the place of some of them’ (Raz 1986, p. 47). Raz thinks 
                                                          
10 Jonathan Quong argues that the NJT generates problematically illiberal results since it seems to allow for someone 
to have authority over another person with respect to anything if it is true that she can help the other person to better 
act on the reasons that apply to that person. Thus, if I have the non-moral goal to go on a holiday trip to country X 
and there is a travel agency that can optimally arrange this trip for me it appears that Raz’s thesis gives this agency 
authority over me with respect to my planning of the trip. Quong points out that, to avoid such problematic 
conclusions, the NJT has to be restricted to cases in which a political authority can help us better to comply with 
moral reasons and duties that independently apply to us (see Quong 2011, chapter 4). However, there is evidence 
that Raz indeed thinks that in the case of political authority the NJT is in fact restricted to moral reasons that apply 
to persons when he says that ‘public authority is ultimately based on the moral duty that which individuals owe to 
their fellow humans’ (Raz 1986, p. 72).   
that in this way authoritative instructions ought to replace our own reasoning about an issue. A 
simultaneous, secondary feature of content-independent reasons is that they act as ‘exclusionary 
reason[s]’ (Raz 1990, p. 39), which is to say that they tell us to not act on other reasons we might 
have. As the NJT explains, the exclusionary and content-independent force of authoritative 
directives is ultimately justified by the fact that conformity with these instructions enables us to 
do better what we have reasons to do anyway.  
The fundamental instrumental value of political authorities’ moral power 
What is crucial about Raz’s account is that it shows that an authority is usually justified in 
altering or creating new reasons for action for its subjects and to forbid them to act on their own 
evaluation of the reasons involved because these instructions benefit the subjects in some way.  
According to the service conception of authority, the exercise of political power is considered 
legitimate since it helps to realize some of the most basic interests of those subject to the 
authority. Political authorities can be legitimate if and because they solve important problems for 
us and thereby enable our collective social practices. Hume agrees with this explanation when 
saying: ‘if the reason be asked of that obedience, which we are bound to pay to government, I 
readily answer, because society could not otherwise subsist’ (Hume 1994, p. 197). Since 
maintaining our social practices is a fundamental interest we all share, political authorities that 
help us in performing these tasks are of fundamental instrumental value. Without their 
coordinating services, complex social enterprises like human societies would not be possible. 
This enabling function of political authority also for Raz constitutes its primary justification. To 
him ‘a major, if not the main, factor in establishing the legitimacy of political authorities is their 
ability to secure coordination’ (Raz 2006, p. 1031).  
This paper was published by Res Publica and is available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11158-015-9267-0 
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The fundamental value that political authorities can have as the servants of their subjects is 
something that the claim-right to rule view ignores. As we saw, according to the latter, political 
authorities are only justifiable if they also publically realize the moral equality of their subjects. 
However, the service conception takes its appeal from the fact that people have other, more basic 
interests that are important enough to justify political authority – even if this authority is not 
democratic. It is this basic and enabling role that political authority can have that explains why 
the subjects have decisive moral reasons to comply with the commands of the authority that 
operates by exercising a moral power. There are a number of salient general human interests 
(other than the interest in participating in the collective decision-making process) that can play 
this justificatory role: our interest in coordinating our collective practices (which sometimes 
means having an interest in having a rule we can follow rather than having any particular rule11); 
our interest in having what we need to survive; our interest in being able to fulfil our duties 
toward others. Thus, non-democratic institutions are legitimate not because they help their 
subjects exercise their (interest in and) claim-right to participate in public decision-making; they 
are legitimate because they enable them to realize some of their other morally important 
interests. 
Throughout this paper I have avoided the claim that non-democratic service authorities can 
generate a general duty to obey for their subjects. I have done so partly because I do not think 
that generating such a duty is necessary for having authority and partly because adequately 
defending this alternative position is the topic of (at least) another paper. However, I would like 
to hint briefly at why I think a general duty of obedience is not a necessary component of 
legitimate authority. Although many philosophers hold that authority consists centrally in 
                                                          
11 This non-epistemic explanation of political legitimacy is indebted to Jerry Gaus’s idea of political authorities as 
umpires (Gaus 1996, pp. 188-191). 
exercising a moral power, few of them address the problem that within the Hohfeldian scheme a 
power does not correlate with a duty but with a liability (for an exception see Perry 2013). Raz 
certainly thinks a legitimate authority (that he thinks is based on a power) must be able to 
generate duties for its subjects (see Raz 1994, p. 325). However, he also doubts that even 
democratic states can create a general duty to obey (Raz 1986, p. 104). Perry (2013), on the other 
hand, holds that a power-based authority can only function if we have a reason to obey the 
authority in the first place.   
Others (see Applbaum 2010; Enoch 2012, pp. 23-28) deny that establishing such a general 
duty of compliance is a necessary condition for being a legitimate authority or that it is a crucial 
aspect of the operation of authority. Instead, what is indispensable for being an authority and for 
giving the subjects decisive moral reasons for compliance is being able to give exclusionary 
reasons for action (that is to say: reasons to consider only those reasons given by the authority). 
And according to the NJT, service authorities can give their subjects exclusionary reasons for 
action insofar as they can enable their subjects to better comply with moral reasons that 
independently apply to them. Among these independent moral reasons are the subjects’ 
aforementioned interests (e.g. in coordination). Moral duties might figure amongst the interests 
of subjects that legitimize authority. But that does not mean that an authority has to generate 
itself a duty to obey in order to help its subjects to better realize their interests and to fulfil their 
independent moral duties. Thus, also a non-democratic service authority can give such 
exclusionary reasons by exercising its power to change its subjects’ normative situation.12 But in 
contrast to views that take a claim-right to obedience to be a necessary requirement of legitimate 
                                                          
12 For these reasons, I think that those who advance the so-called ‘directionality thesis’ (see e.g. Darwall 2010) are 
mistaken in two respects: they are wrong to think that a legitimate authority-holder must herself possess a claim-
right to being obeyed; and they are mistaken to think that legitimate authority requires a claim-right to be obeyed in 
the first place.  
This paper was published by Res Publica and is available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11158-015-9267-0 
 
17 
 
authority, on the power-based view subjects do not violate a duty by disregarding the 
exclusionary reasons their authority gives them. Instead, by disrespecting these reasons they have 
made themselves liable to having their normative situation altered, e.g. by having penalties 
imposed on them (see Applbaum 2010, pp. 230-232). 
In virtue of offering a particular response to the ‘grounds of authority’ question (namely: that 
it is the interests of the subjects13 that justify the authority’s power), the service conception 
therefore also provides a different explanation of the ‘nature of authority’ question (viz. its 
conceptual core consists in the exercise of a moral power to command, not a claim-right to be 
obeyed). Since we cannot survive and treat others justly without the coordinative capacities of 
political authorities we have thus decisive moral reasons to comply with the authoritative 
instructions that generate such coordination. It is therefore important to note that it is the 
subjects’ legitimate fundamental interests (that apply to them independently of the existence of 
authority) that ultimately generate these reasons to comply with the instructions of an authority 
that can help the subjects to discharge their duties and to realize their interests. Raz’s service 
conception and the NJT thus provide a substantive account of how political power can be 
legitimate, a ‘Power-Right to Command View’,14 which is less restrictive than the democratic 
view of legitimacy in that it does not focus on (or take as a necessary requirement of legitimacy 
the fulfilment of) the subjects’ interest in having their moral equality publically respected. The 
service conception, in other words, allows us to conjointly hold claims (a), (b), and (c) and thus 
to avoid the problematic conclusions outlined in this section and the previous one.  
                                                          
13 Other than their interest in having their moral equality respected in collective decision-making.  
14 I choose this formulation to highlight the fact that service authorities do not possess a right to rule of the kind that 
is based on the interests of the right-holders (which would have to be a claim-right). 
These points lead to the conclusion that it is the ‘Power-Right to Command View’ (and not 
the democratic one) that constitutes the primary (in the sense of basic) notion of political 
authority. Democratic institutions (and the right to rule), accordingly, are but special cases of this 
more basic service conception as they focus on actualizing a particular interest of people: on 
respecting their moral equality in collective decision-making. Democratic institutions might 
constitute the fullest realisation of the idea of legitimate authority. What the service conception 
denies is that they are the only realisation of this concept.15 
The power-based view of legitimacy and the value of democracy 
Democracy is – without doubt – of special value. Thus, the question arises: given that the service 
view of authority denies that democratic authorisation is generally a necessary condition of 
legitimacy, does it invite colonialism or domination – or can it account for the importance that 
most people attribute to democracy?16 
There has been considerable debate about this question. Some theorists argue that democratic 
authority has certain epistemic advantages over other forms of authority. According to David 
Estlund (2008) what constitutes part of the value of democratic procedures is that they tend to 
produce better decisions: the larger the number of voters, the more likely it is that they make the 
right decision in cases where there is a right and a wrong alternative. Hélène Landemore (2012), 
as well, argues that democratic procedures generate better political outcomes. She points at 
empirical studies that suggest that it is the diversity of views among voters that leads to better 
                                                          
15 The difference between the democratic claim-right view and the service conception of authority is thus not a 
conceptual but a normative one. They disagree on which conception of authority is the normatively more 
fundamental one.  
16 In this paper, I am not trying to answer the question whether democracy has intrinsic or instrumental value. My 
explanation of the way in which the service view of authority can relate to the importance of democracy is not 
committed to either of these ideas. 
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decisions. These epistemic accounts align with the NJT in that they make an instrumental case 
for democracy: what (partly) justifies democratic authorities is that they provide the service of 
facilitating better decisions.  
However, others deny that instrumental justifications can capture the real value of 
democracy. According to Scott Hershovitz (2003), for example, the NJT fails as an account of 
legitimate authority since it cannot account for the fact that citizens of democratic states treat 
each other as moral equals when making collective decision. Thus, he holds, the service 
conception misses the point that ‘making decisions together can be more important than getting 
them right’ (Hershovitz 2003, p. 218). 
Another group of philosophers, though, points out that with respect to democratic procedures 
the NJT can be seen to be at work in a non-instrumental way. Christiano, for instance, 
acknowledges that  
Raz’s normal justification thesis could conceivably accommodate [the] 
conception of democratic authority [as a unique public realisation of equality in 
collective decision-making]. For one might say that one acts better in accordance 
with the principle of equality by deferring to the decision of the democratic 
assembly than by trying to advance equality on one’s own (Christiano 2008, p. 
252).  
And according to Daniel Viehoff (2011), democracy has special value as a unique arbitration 
procedure. Given that we often disagree on what is the right thing to do, democratic procedures 
allow us to arrive at collective decisions while respecting each other’s differing opinions and 
(thus) moral equality. What both Christiano’s and Viehoff’s arguments emphasize is that the 
service conception can account for the particular non-instrumental procedural value of 
democracy by explaining how this kind of governance helps the citizens to realize and fulfil one 
of their particularly important moral interests (to have their moral equality respected in the 
collective decision-making process) and duties (to respect the outcome of that process). 
Thus, a Power-Right to Command View based on the service conception does not have to 
deny the validity of the claim that (a) there are democratic authorities that possess the right to 
rule. Neither do democratic theorists do have to give up on their claim that democratic authorities 
have particular value when they accept the Power-Right to Command View. The only thing the 
latter denies is that democratic authority is the primary notion (and always a necessary condition) 
of political legitimacy and the main standard against which all other forms of justified authority 
have to be measured. Instead, according to the Power-Right to Command View, what is at the 
centre of political legitimacy is a moral power (answering the ‘nature of authority’ question) that 
is based on fulfilling the fundamental interests and duties of those subject to the authority 
(answering the ‘grounds of authority’ question). Its point of departure is not the interests of the 
possible claim-right to rule holders. Instead, this view holds that – in order for democratic 
authorisation to be a necessary condition of legitimate authority – we need to refer to further 
normatively relevant factors. These further aspects will often depend on the context we are 
considering.17 In this sense, Allen Buchanan argues that only ‘where democratic authorisation is 
possible (and can be pursued without excessive risk to basic rights) it is necessary for political 
legitimacy’ (Buchanan 2004, p. 259).18 However, where such democratic procedures are not 
                                                          
17 Raz (2006, p. 1031) agrees with this conditional relevance of democratic authorisation.  
18 This is, of course, not a minor point. It is to say: whenever democratic authorisation is possible it is a necessary 
condition of political legitimacy. And surely also the subjects of non-democratic authorities have an interest in 
participating in the political decisions that deeply affect them. However, the point I make here is that in situations in 
which this interest cannot be realized authorities can be morally justified without respecting this interest in 
participation in political decision-making if they provide other indispensable services for their subjects. 
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possible, but morally important tasks have to be performed, non-democratic authorities, too, can 
permissibly implement rules and obligate their subjects.  
The importance of the ‘power-right to command’ view for global justice 
However, there are other virtues to construing the idea of political legitimacy in terms of the 
exercise of a moral power besides its greater theoretical appeal. The short remainder of this 
essay is devoted to showing that the characterisation of justified authority as resting on a Power-
Right to Command View can be of considerable advantage when we try to think about how to 
address some very pressing practical moral problems. One such prominent and urgent issue 
regards the question of how we ought to react to the poverty and the relative detrimental 
inequalities that exist throughout our world. As we will see, this problem presents a case in 
which the interpretation of legitimate authority as a power-right to impose and alter duties has 
some real bite.    
If we would accept the view that legitimate authority is based on claim-right to rule, the 
question of whether the poverty-related suffering in the world generates transnational 
distributive obligations poses a tremendous difficulty. Some philosophers, for instance, reject 
the very idea of global distributive justice because they think that the concept of distributive 
justice presupposes the existence of common political authorities that act in the name of their 
subjects. To these philosophers, the elimination of harmful interpersonal disparities is generally 
not independent of having to justify the use of coercive political institutions. Because such 
institutions enforce rules on their subjects, the price they have to pay for the moral power to 
coerce is to treat the subjects with equal concern – which must include giving the subjects a 
democratic say in the collective decision-making process. But these philosophers often also hold 
that we are under no obligation to establish new joint authorities with people from other 
countries.19 Currently, there are no democratic international institutions that act in the name of 
all those they coerce. Supporters of the claim-right to rule view thus have to conclude that only 
voluntarily accepted transnational obligations and humanitarian aid can count as morally 
justifiable attempts to fight poverty-related suffering. But if the legitimacy of international 
authorities depends on democratic authorisation and global democracy is non-existent and not a 
mandatory objective, these philosophers might be right in claiming that there are no sound 
principles of global distributive justice. 
Advocates of the claim-right to rule view encounter another difficulty when addressing the 
problem of existing harmful global inequalities. This difficulty is caused by some democratic 
theorists’ rejection of the very idea of global democracy. For Christiano (2010), for instance, 
global democracy is not only non-existent at present but also normatively undesirable. He 
argues that the current geo-political and economic situation does not warrant the normative 
conditions for establishing global democratic institutions. For instance, not all human beings 
currently have equal stakes in those actual international practices that would require 
authoritative regulation (Christiano 2010, pp. 132, 133). But democracy is valuable because 
                                                          
19 This restrictive view is often attributed to Thomas Nagel (2005). However, it is possible to interpret Nagel’s 
argument in more charitable way. Nagel uses the term ‘justice’ in an idiosyncratic way to refer only to egalitarian 
justice. Thus, on the charitable view of Nagel, his restriction of duties of distributive justice to associations that are 
ruled by one and the same authority can be read as merely limiting the concern for equality to these associative 
contexts. This would leave open the possibility that Nagel endorses a sufficiency principle of global distributive 
justice and only rejects the idea of global egalitarian justice. It could then be the case that common non-democratic 
international institutions can give rise to non-egalitarian global distributive duties of justice. But even on the 
charitable view, two of Nagel’s claims cause him to conclude that, due to the way our world is right now, questions 
of distributive justice do not arise at all in the global sphere. This is because he thinks that common authorities are a 
necessary condition for the enforcement of any duties of distributive justice, and because he also thinks that current 
democratic states have no obligations to establish common international authorities (Nagel 2005, pp. 121, 140). 
Thus, even on the charitable interpretation, Nagel’s argument generates the following problem: while non-
egalitarian duties of global distributive justice might be conceivable as a result of common non-democratic global 
institutions, the possibility of egalitarian duties of global distributive justice depends on the existence of a common 
democratic authority.  
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(and insofar as) it allows people, whose actions have profound effects on each other’s lives, to 
equally influence the determination of the public rules they all live by. There is little 
disagreement among political philosophers that the deep level of interdependency that we find 
in nation states is not reached in the global sphere. It would therefore seem unjustifiable for us 
to establish a global democracy that would give equal decision-making power to people with 
unequal stakes in political decisions. The stakes people have in decisions on international rules 
are not even roughly equal, unlike the stakes citizens of one country have in decisions on 
national legislation.20  
Many democratic theorists believe that the democratic decision-making model is the best 
one available to ensure the accountability of political authorities. However, if democratic 
authorisation is a necessary condition of legitimacy, we face a dilemma. On the one hand, we 
can be thought to have duties to work toward the elimination of gross and extremely harmful 
global inequalities.21 On the other hand, though, internationally the normative conditions of the 
possibility of democratic global authority are not met. Thus, Christiano (2012, p. 92) thinks that 
with respect to fighting global poverty and working toward a more just world we are confronted 
with a deliberative impasse: although we require international institutions to combat the 
problem caused by global poverty, such institutions cannot be legitimate because they cannot be 
democratic.22 One problematic implication of the claim-right to rule account of political 
                                                          
20 It is of course a further question whether these unequal stakes are not themselves the result of an objectionable 
international order and how we ought to weigh different kinds of stakes against each other. 
21 The same thought seems applicable to other global collective action problems such as climate change, the 
international tax competition, and the regulation of the international financial markets. 
22 I take it the fact that Christiano thinks of this situation as an ‘impasse’ shows that he does not accept claim (c) that 
non-democratic authorities can be democratic on their own without some grounding in another democratic 
institution. If he would accept (c) he would not have to think of the current global situation as an impasse: if we need 
authoritative global coordination and decision-making, but no global democratic institutions are possible or 
desirable, we could (as the argument in this paper suggests) opt for creating non-democratic global service 
institutions to help us fulfill very salient moral duties and realize vital human interests. However, Christiano does 
not contemplate this option. 
legitimacy is therefore that fighting global poverty must be left to voluntary agreements among 
states. All we can do to eliminate existing detrimental inequalities is to hope for the good will of 
the rich nations in this world. Unfortunately, a look into the recent history shows that in this 
case we should not be too optimistic.  
So how exactly does the Power-Right to Command View help us to better engage with 
questions of global justice? It does so by morally allowing for non-democratic global service 
authorities whose job it is to enforce salient duties of justice in the international sphere. Such 
institutions would not have to amount to the creation of a world state. They could instead 
supplement the existing authority of states where the latters’ coordinating and enforcing abilities 
run out (see e.g. Buchanan 2011). Further, the fact that we do not internationally agree about 
what we owe to each other within and across our existing states is not an insurmountable 
problem for the Power-Right to Command View. Rather, according to the latter, global 
governance institutions could enforce relatively uncontroversial general duties such as bans on 
aggressive wars, weapons trading, unfair terms and conditions of trade, the persecution of war 
criminals, and the exclusion of people from making use of a share of the world’s resources etc. 
The point here is not to argue for a detailed account of what such institutions would have to look 
like or what duties we have globally. What the present discussion aims to show is that the 
Power-Right to Command View (which rests on the exercise of moral powers and focuses on 
the interests of subjects instead of right-holders of a right to rule and thus provides distinct 
answers to the ‘grounds of authority’ and ‘nature of authority’ questions) can help us better to 
address pressing problems of our time in ways that are precluded by other theories of political 
legitimacy – such as the claim-right to rule view. The non-democratic global service institutions 
we would thus create do not have to be considered ‘dim reflections of’ a primary democratic 
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notion of authority. They would instead be legitimate as prime instances of the basic service 
notion of political authority. The Power-Right to Command View, therefore, is not only more 
coherent with an important set of theoretical convictions. At the level of application it also 
provides us with a more helpful account of justified political authority than those views that 
focus on a claim-right to rule. 
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